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I INTRODUCTION 
The correct approach to dealing with mental disorder in the criminal justice 
process poses one of the most challenging problems Parliament and the judicial 
system must resolve. Advances in identifying, classifying, and treating mental 
disorders require a system that is flexible and able to account for contemporary 
scientific developments. Historically, those suffering from mental disorder have 
been subjected to discrimination and social stigma. Mentally disordered offenders 
have been subjected to overt state control in their lives and "extra-constitutional 
detention". 1 
In the National Study of Psychiatric Morbidity in New Zealand Prisons, it 
was established that there was a higher rate of mental disorder among p1isoners than 
within the community. This is particularly so for personality disorders, bipolar 
disorder, major depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, schizophrenia, and post-
traumatic stress disorder. The study established that approximately 60 per cent of all 
prisoners suffered from at least one major mental disorder. 
2 Accordingly, the 
sentencing and disposition of mentally disordered offenders in the criminal justice 
process is a large issue which, surprisingly, is scarcely reflected in New Zealand's 
existing legal framework. 
The manner in which mentally disordered offenders are treated in the 
criminal justice process requires a differential approach than that applied to 
offenders of "normal" fortitude. The sentencing and disposition of mentally 
disordered offenders is a sensitive area of law where the social protection imperative 
can and often does outweigh fundamental human 1ights. 
In 2003, New Zealand implemented two pieces of legislation; the Criminal 
Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act ("CP(MIP)A"), and the Intellectual 
Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act. Together, these Acts deal 
generally with "mentally impaired" offenders. 
1 Warren Brookbanks and Sandy Simpson Psychiat,y and the Law (Lexis Nexis , Wellington, 2007) 4 . 
2 A I F Simpson and others The National Study of Psychiatric Morbidity in New Zealand Prisons 
(Department of Corrections, Wellington, 1999). 
2 
However, for the most part, the cun-ent law regarding the sentencing and 
disposition of mentally disordered offenders is confusing and inadequate. The 
available defences open to all offenders are not sufficient for the adequate 
sentencing and disposition of mentally disordered offenders. The defence of insanity 
is not wide enough in ambit to deal with the majority of mentally disordered 
offenders. Automatism does not encompass disordered offenders with conscious 
volition. Infanticide will only apply to a very limited class of women.
3 Provocation 
is rarely successful in cases where mental disorder is raised as a characteristic, and is 
likely to be repealed in the near future.
4 Lastly, New Zealand has no defence of 
diminished responsibility, and its introduction is unlikely. 
5 
Unlike in other jurisdictions such as some states m the United States of 
America, in New Zealand mental disorder is not a mandatory consideration that a 
sentencing judge must take into account.
6 Offenders suffering from mental disorder 
will often fall short of fulfilling the requirements for a treatment or care order under 
the CP(MIP)A. 7 For most convicted offenders, the Sentencing Act 2002 will be 
applied by the sentencing judge. 
As a group, mentally disordered offenders often face discrimination from 
society. Mentally disordered offenders are often subjected to longer sentences purely 
because the judicial system does not know the appropriate way of dealing with them, 
or what rehabilitation treatment may work best. It would be equally as 
discriminatory for a person of "normal" fortitude to be forced into a psychiatric 
treatment programme as it would be to place a mentally disordered offender into a 
3 Crimes Act 1961, s 178. 
4 Hon Simon Power "The Criminal Justice System: Reform is Coming" (Victoria University, 
Wellington 23 July 2009). 
5 New Zealand Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, Wellington, 2007). 
6 Thomas Fluent and Melvin Guyer "Defendant's Illness Can Be Used By the Prosecutor as an 
Aggravating Factor in Capital Sentencing" (2006) 34(1) The Journal of the American 
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 110. 
1 R v Chisnall (29 March 2006) HC WANG CRI 2005-083-806. 
prison system where their mental state puts their own and others health and safety at 
risk.8 
This paper posits that the most appropriate way to deal with such offenders is 
by way of amendment to existing sentencing law. Mental disorder is not a 
mandatory mitigating factor in determining a sentence length, and should remain 
that way. However, sentencing law should be amended so that mental disorder can 
be more easily considered by sentencing judges as a relevant factor in determining 
the type of sentence that they are to impose. Mentally disordered offenders should be 
rece1vmg better and more appropriate treatment, which should be flexible as 
scientific rehabilitation tools are improved. Existing governmental policy and 
spending will need to be reassessed for these recommendations to be effective; 
predominant punitive and unforgiving paradigms need readjusting. 
II THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper will establish the deficiencies in the existing legal framework 
with regard to mentally disordered offenders. While mentally disordered offenders 
will often meet the requisite mens rea standards, they have lesser "moral fault", 
justifying differential sentencing and disposition treatment. The existing defences 
are not adequate for the appropriate disposition of mentally disordered offenders. 
Consequently, mentally disordered offenders are dealt with under ordinary 
sentencing laws. The CP(MIP)A and the Sentencing Act 2002, in their current forms, 
are inappropriate for the sentencing and disposition of mentally disordered offenders. 
Due to stringent definitions and broad judicial discretion, the CP(MIP)A is limited in 
ambit for dealing with the majority of mentally disordered offenders. The 
Sentencing Act 2002 disregards mental disorder entirely. 
8 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n I. 
4 
A The Doctrine of Mens Rea 
Mens rea is Latin for the "guilty mind". It is a fundamental p1inciple in New 
Zealand's criminal justice process that in order to convict a person of a criminal 
offence, his or her action must generally be intended. 
9 The law has used the 
philosophy of the "will" to distinguish between what is intended and what is 
unintended. The "will" is distinct from other mental activities such as wondering and 
imagining. 1° For most offences an offender must understand the nature and 
consequences of their actions, and have a genuine opportunity to be able to act 
otherwise for criminal liability to accrue.
11 
1 Mental Disorder and Mens Rea 
What is and is not a mental disorder is a constantly evolving notion. The 
development of scientific tools and research methods requires frequent changes to 
the conditions and criteria that define what mental disorders are. For example, where 
homosexuality once was considered a mental disorder, it is not considered so now. 
The DSM IV defines mental disorder as any "clinically significant behavioural or 
psychological syndrome often associated with distress, disorder or with a 
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disorder or important loss of 
freedom". 12 For the purposes of this paper, the medical definition of mental disorder, 
as defined by the DSM IV, will be utilised. 
Often a mental disorder will detract from a person's ability to act in an 
entirely intentional manner, or to understand the nature and consequences of their 
actions. However, this is not the only way a mental disorder may affect someone. A 
mental disorder will not necessarily mean an offender lacks the requisite mens rea 
9 R D Mackay Mental Condition Def ences in th e Criminal Law (1 ed , Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1995). 
10 HA Pritchard Acting Willing, Desiring in White ( ed) The Philosophy of Action, 61. 
11 H LA Hart The Concept of Law (2 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994). 
12 American Psychiatric Association Task Force Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders: DSM-IV(4 ed, American Psychiatric Association, Washington, 1994). 
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for the offence. Some of the more se1iously disordered offenders will know what 
they are doing is wrong, but may think that they are so above the law that the law 
does not apply to them. For example, mentally disordered offenders suffering from 
psychopathy or antisocial personality disorder often exhibit grandiose behaviours, 
where they demonstrate a preference for their own moral code over that of society's. 
Another example may be where an offender knows and appreciates that their 
conduct is against the law but are unable to prevent it, at least in part, due to mental 
disorder. 
The basis for imposing punitive sentences on people requires a guilty mind. 
Mental disorder short of insanity should, at a minimum, be considered as a factor at 
sentencing. R v Tuia recognised that mentally disordered offenders may be deemed 
to lack full moral responsibility. In this way, moral responsibility and guilty mind 
are synonymous. 13 While many mentally disordered offenders are able to meet the 
requisite mens rea standard for criminal sanctions, their lesser moral fault requires 
that they should receive differential treatment within the criminal justice process at 
sentencing. 
B Definitional Inconsistencies 
1 Law and medicine 
Disparity exists between what is defined by law as and what is defined by 
mental health experts as mental disorder. There is no precise legal definition of 
mental disorder, and any inquiry is not bound by medical evidence. Inconsistency 
with medical evidence is not a ground for holding a verdict unreasonable. 14 
At law, Judges often undertake a "disease of mind" inquiry when 
determining the existence of mental disorder. The disease of mind inquiry allows for 
a broad range of mental conditions to be taken into account, but it also has included 
states which would not be described as a mental disorder, such as sleepwalking and 
13 R v Tuia (27 November 2002) CA 312/02 , 27 . 
14 R v Ratana (1995) 12 CRNZ 650 . 
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diabetes. 15 A further philosophical disparity between law and the behavioural 
sciences is that the law is based on the notion of "free will" and that the behavioural 
sciences tend to be deterministic and based on explaining factors which determine 
behaviour. 16 Accordingly, the law and the sciences are severely out of sync with 
each other. Appropriately addressing the issue of mental disorder within the criminal 
justice process will require the two schools of thought to be more interdependent. 
2 Mental impairment, intellectual disability and mental disorder 
Mental disorder can also be distinguished from intellectual disability. Both 
can fall under the generic title of "mental impairment", as it appears in the 
CP(MIP)A. 17 Mental disorder differs from intellectual disability, which can be 
defined as the early onset of "a permanent impairment of cognitive capacity" and 
"impairment to adaptive functioning."
18 The two distinguishable impairments also 
differ in the treatment required. A mentally disordered person may respond to 
cognitive behavioural therapies and other treatment programmes to target their 
particular cognitions and behavioural patterns, where an intellectually disabled 
offender may require care and supervision. This paper does not seek to address the 
issues related to the treatment of intellectually disabled offenders. 
C Defences 
The operation of defences open to all offenders in New Zealand law is 
deficient in appropriately dealing with mentally disordered offenders. The defence 
of insanity is rarely used and even more rarely successful. Automatism does not 
cover mentally disordered offenders with conscious volition. Infanticide applies only 
to a limited class of women. Provocation can act to the detriment of mentally 
15 R v Hamblyn (1997) 15 CRNZ 58. 
16 Gary Melton Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health 
Professionals and Lawyers (Guilford Press, New York, 2007) 8. 
17 WaitemataHealth vA-G(2001)21 FRNZ216. 
18 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1, 342. 
disordered offenders, and is pending repeal. New Zealand does not have a defence of 
diminished responsibility. These defences will be discussed in tum below. 
1 The defence of insanity 
The insanity defence is not wide enough in ambit to deal with all mentally 
disordered offenders. The insanity defence is created by section 23 of the Crimes 
Act 1961. A not guilty by reason of insanity verdict will result in a full acquittal. It is 
available to only the most insane offenders. The defence encompasses a significant 
range of human frailty that is taken into account when assessing culpability. It is 
most commonly relied on by offenders with recognised mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia, delusional disorder, or bipolar. Offenders suffering from less 
common mental disorders such as alcohol and drug withdrawal, dissociative 
disorders, cerebral trauma, or dementia also occasionally rely on it. Offenders with 
se1ious mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder, paraphilia, 
personality disorders, or psychopathy rarely rely on it. Furthermore, offenders "fear" 
an insanity verdict and do not often plead it, thus covering a limited amount of 
mentally disordered offenders. There is a particularly high threshold for insanity. 
Insanity is only raised for the most serious offences because committal as a special 
patient is a risk only worth running in relation to these. It is used rarely and 
selectively. 19 
Some of the most senous mental disorders often fall short of being 
recognised under the defence of insanity, such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
("PTSD"). PTSD is a mental disorder which results in both psychological and 
physical manifestations, such as emotional numbing and an increased startle 
response. Although PTSD is a serious mental disorder, it is rarely successful in 
returning a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. This is because the test for 
insanity relies on a distinction between cognitive and volitional defects. Volitional 
defects are those where a mentally disordered offender will intend their actions, but 
may not be able to control their urges or tendencies. The test leaves no place for 
19 Mackay, above n 9 . 
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volitional defects, which 1s out of step with prevailing psychiatric thinking. 
20 
Accordingly, the insanity defence is arbitrarily selective; excluding some people 
who are obviously insane such as those suffering from the grandiose symptoms of 
psychopathy who, in their nature will understand the law, but will think that they are 
above it. 
2 The defence of automatism 
Automatism cannot account for the majority of mentally disordered 
offenders. Automatism is a common law defence preserved by section 20 of the 
Crimes Act 1961. It covers situations where a defendant claims that they were not in 
control of their actions that amounted to criminal liability. Common assertions of 
automatism involve actions committed by reflex, or by sleepwalking. However, 
automatism is arguably a denial of the actus reus as opposed to being a defence. 
Furthermore, the internal-external test can be artificial, for example resulting in 
different outcomes for the same disease in Quick and Hennessy.2
1 
Like the insanity defence, automatism does not encompass mentally 
disordered offenders who had conscious volition, but were unable to control 
themselves. It also does not extend to offenders who did not believe what they were 
doing was wrong or against the law, such as those suffering from psychopathy or 
personality disorders. These are the offenders who are most in need of treatment and 
rehabilitation, yet the criminal justice process overlooks them. 
3 The defence of infanticide 
The defence of infanticide is created by section 178 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
By creating the offence of infanticide, it acts as a defence to what otherwise would 
be culpable homicide. The historical existence of infanticide was based on actions of 
females which did not conform to the "predete1mined Victorian female and maternal 
20 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1. 
21 See R v Quick [1973] QB 910 and R v Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9. 
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mother" behaviour. Nowadays, many scientists view medical evidence for the 
existence of infanticide as outdated and of questionable validity. 22 Leading 
psychiatric research been found that evidence of infanticide usually relies on 
temporal sequence of mental disorder following birth, as opposed to linking mental 
disorder directly to giving birth.23 
Data exists that suggests it is not childbirth itself that alters a mother's state 
of mind so that they are incapable of forming an understanding of the act of 
murder. 24 While depression after childbirth is common, it is widely thought that 
most cases of infanticide are more likely a result of emotional pressures or 
personality characteristics. 25 The law and the sciences are at odds; 26 in law such 
pressures and characteristics will not meet the section 178 requirements. However, 
mental disorder stemming from child birth is found readily due to sympathy for the 
mother. Studies indicate that approximately 50 per cent of women convicted of 
infanticide kill their children in the context of unwanted, concealed pregnancies, 
while the remainder are thought to be physically abusive resulting in death.27 
It is unclear why there is a specific defence, which differs from the general 
defences, dealing with only one state of mental disorder. In other jurisdictions, 
infanticide is subsumed by the defence of diminished responsibility. In New Zealand, 
it could be subsumed by insanity. The continued existence of the defence of 
22 Velma Dobson and Bruce Sales "The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness" (2000) 6(4) 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 1103 . 
23 Ian Lambie "Mothers who kill: The crime of Infanticide" (2001) 24 International Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry, 74. 
24 Dobson and Sales, above n 22 . 
25 C Rouge-Maillart, N Jousset, and B Bouju "Women who kill their children" (2005) 26(4) The 
American Journal ofForensic Medicine and Pathology, 320-326. 
26 Norman Finkel , John Burke and Leticia Chavez "Common Sense Judgments of Infanticide: Murder, 
Manslaughter, Madness, or Miscellaneous?" 6(4) (2002) Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 
1113. 
27 Lambie, above n 23. 
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infanticide arguably only affirms an ongoing societal belief in an inherent weakness 
. 28 
m women. 
4 The partial defence of provocation 
Section 169 of the Crimes Act 1961 creates the partial defence of 
provocation. It applies only to murder and it reduces a murder charge to 
manslaughter. In most common law jurisdictions, provocation is for those who are 
mentally "normal". However, the majority of these jmisdictions also have the 
"companion" defence of diminished responsibility. In New Zealand, provocation is 
rarely successful for defendant's with mental disorders, due to the requirement for 
ordinary self-control. In the Law Commission's report on provocation, a mental 
disorder was successfully raised as a characteristic relevant to provocation in only 
one of81 cases.
29 
The Law Commission has suggested repeal of the defence of provocation.
30 
In cases such as R v Rongonui where provocation was successful,
31 reference to the 
defendant's abnormality of mind may have been more appropriate than referring to 
the victim as "provoking" their own murder. The Law Commission further 
recommended that provocation should be weighed with other aggravating and 
mitigating factors as part of the sentencing process. It is more appropriate to deal 
with provocation and mental disorder at sentencing where it can be graded along a 
continuum as opposed to disorder being considered as a black and white issue as the 
defence stands now.
32 Its repeal is also justified on the basis that it can be confusing 
to a layperson. 
28 Andrew Payne "Infanticide and child abuse" (1995) 6 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, 474. 
29 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1. 
30 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 5. 
31 R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZIR 385. 
32 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 5. 
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5 The partial defence of diminished responsibility 
A defence of diminished responsibility directly takes mental characteristics 
into account. It is a partial defence and reduces murder to manslaughter. The defence 
is available to those defendants who are unable to meet the high threshold for the 
defence of insanity but where it would be overly harsh, because of their mental state, 
to hold them fully responsible for murder. 
Diminished responsibility is perceived as a way of untying the hands of 
sentencing judges in homicide cases where mental disorder was clearly an acting 
factor in the offending.33 Diminished responsibility, as it stands in other jurisdictions, 
has a limited application to homicide offences only. Accordingly, the introduction of 
a defence of diminished responsibility would not be able to solve the holistic 
problem of the sentencing and disposition of mentally disordered offenders in the 
criminal justice process. Moreover, a successful defence of diminished responsibility 
results only in a reduction in the sentence length, putting those who are in need of 
treatment and rehabilitation back into the community faster. Retuming these 
offenders to the community quicker, without appropriate treatment and rehabilitation, 
fails to serve any positive goal in the criminal justice process. 
At present, the defence of diminished responsibility has not been introduced 
into New Zealand. There are some hints of diminished responsibility within 
provocation where mental characteristics have been taken into account. The defence 
of infanticide could be viewed as a limited form of diminished responsibility. 
However, it is not a substantive defence in New Zealand, which has been reaffirmed 
in R v Gordon. 34 There have been various attempts to introduce it, such as the 
introduction of the unsuccessful clause 180 of the Crimes Bill 1960. 
The introduction of a defence of diminished responsibility would bring New 
Zealand law into step with a number of other commonwealth countries, such as 
England and Scotland. The introduction of such a defence would allow for a wider 
33 David N Weiss tub Law and Psychiat,y in th e Canadian Context (1 ed, Pergamon Press, New York, 
1980), 621. 
34 R v Gordon (1993) 10 CRNZ430 . 
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scope of mental disorders to be considered in law that at present do not satisfy the 
test of insanity, and are excluded from considerations under the defence of 
provocation.35 The idea of the introduction of diminished responsibility is popular 
with defending counsel and with a large portion of medical experts and expert 
witnesses. However, a major justification for the existence of the defence of 
diminished responsibility no longer exists in New Zealand, in that the mandatory life 
sentence has been repealed. 36 The Law Commission, in the Battered Defendants 
Report, recommended that no diminished responsibility defence should be 
introduced, and that mental disorder is better to be taken into account at 
sentencing.37 This recommendation was made in 2001, and yet no specific inclusion 
of mental disorder as a relevant consideration was included in the Sentencing Act 
2002. 
Introducing a defence of diminished responsibility, while being a step in the 
right direction, would not be sufficient in approp1iately dealing with mentally 
disordered offenders in the criminal justice process. In the meantime, legal 
professionals and the judiciary should devote sufficient time and weight to mental 
disorder at sentencing as a relevant consideration. 
D The Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 
The CP(MIP)A was intended to cover mentally impaired persons who were 
unfit to stand trial, and the most mentally disordered offenders, such as many of 
those who returned a successful defence of insanity verdict. It cannot and does not 
cover all mentally disordered offenders in the criminal justice process. By providing 
sentencing judges with the ability to order concurrent sentences of imprisonment and 
35 Warren Brookbanks "Diminished Responsibility: balm or bane?" in Movements and markers in 
criminal policy (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1984) 82. 
36 New Zealand Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered 
Defendants (NZLC R73 , Wellington, 2001). 
37 Ibid. 
13 
detainment in a mental health institute, the Act provides a mechanism which unfairly 
discriminates against many of the offenders that it covers . 
1 "Mental impairment " 
The CP(MIP)A utilises the term "mental impairment'' as the threshold a 
judge utilise in deciding whether to sentence an offender concurrently to detention in 
a mental health institute and in a penal institute.
38 The term "mental impairment" 
was deliberately left wide by Parliament so that the "courts [were] free to interpret 
the term in line with the overall purpose of ensuring procedural faimess". 39 To make 
an order under section 34, the Court must be satisfied that compulsory care is 
required because of the "mental impairment". While the High Court in R v Chisnall 
held that intellectual disability can clearly be a mental impairment, it also clearly 
inferred that some mental disorders, such as personality disorders, will not qualify as 
mental impainnent.40 A personality disorder must be recognised and severe to the 
extent that it amounts to an "abnormal state of mind". 
41 The test to determine 
whether a given person meets the "mental impairment" threshold is whether the 
condition "produces pathology which may be susceptible to treatment in a clinical 
setting".42 As a threshold to reach when establishing whether or not to impose an 
order, susceptibility to treatment should not be the standard. While this threshold is 
closer aligned to the thinking of the medical profession, a mentally disordered 
offender should not be imprisoned solely because the sciences have not established 
an effective rehabilitation scheme. Accordingly, the inappropriate standard by which 
mental impairment is assessed will mean that many mentally disordered offenders, 
particularly those who are not "susceptible to treatment" in a clinical setting, will not 
38 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 , s 34(2). 
39 Justice and Law Reform Committee "Criminal Justice Amendment (No 7) Bill Explanatory 
Material" 2001 . 
40 R v Chisnall, above n 7. 
41 WaitemataHealth vA-G, aboven 17. 
42 Ibid. 
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be covered by the CP(MIP)A leaving them to be sentenced under the Sentencing Act 
2002. 
2 Considerations required in making an order 
Before making an order under the CP(MIP)A, the Court must be satisfied 
that detention in a hospital is necessaiy in the offender's interests or in the interests 
of public safety. 
43 The Court will consider all the relevant circumstances when 
assessing the safety of the offender or public safety. These circumstances are not 
limited to the offender's own safety and the safety of the public generally; R v 
Chisnall held that the Court could assess the risk of exploitation of others in the 
hospital setting.
44 It was held that if an offender posed a risk to other's treatment, 
this would eliminate the benefit of placing them in a hospital. Finite imprisonment 
was justified on this basis. 
The Courts have held that section 34 of the CP(MIP)A does not remove the 
requirements for a sentencing judge to take into account the sentencing principles 
and purposes under the Sentencing Act 2002.
45 The High Court in Police v R held 
that while there may be understandable compassion for mentally disordered 
offenders, any focused attention on rehabilitation was not the proper approach to 
take in dete1mining an appropriate sentence.
46 Therefore, the safety threshold is not 
as easy as it first appears for a mentally disordered offender to meet. Furthermore, 
even if this threshold is met, a sentencing judge may still deem an order to be 
unnecessaiy or inappropriate. Accordingly, not only does the legislation need to be 
questioned, but also its use by sentencing judges. This provision will mean that 
many mentally disordered offenders will not receive treatment under the CP(MIP)A, 
and are left to be sentenced by the Sentencing Act 2002. 
43 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 , s 34(2). 
44 R v Chisnall, above n 7. 
45 Police v R (2 November 2007) HC CHCH CRJ-2007-409-188 . 
46 Ibid. 
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3 Evidence of impairment 
The CP(MIP)A has no requirement for certification of mental disorder from 
a medical expert for an order to be made. Section 34(3) requires the Court to be 
satisfied that an offender is mentally disordered, on the evidence of one or more 
health assessors. This gives sentencing judges great discretion in exercising their 
powers to make an order under section 34(1 ). While under the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Care and Treatment) Act 1992 ("MH(CAT)A"), which has 
subsequently been repealed in part, the certificates of health assessors were not 
binding on the sentencing judge, they were afforded great weight as they certified 
that the offender had satisfied specific diagnostic criteria.47 Without this certification, 
there is "no obligation on the Court to specifically address each condition nominated 
in subsection 2 [that the mental disorder requires compulsory care in the interests of 
the offenders safety or the safety of the public] even though he or she must be 
satisfied of those matters in a global sense."48 The disregard sentencing judges may 
have of medical opinion could result in an arbitrary distinction being made between 
mentally disordered offenders. Those who may have received treatment under the 
provisions of the MH(CAT)A may not receive such care under the CP(MIP)A. 
4 Concurrent sentences 
The CP(MIP)A was designed to fill a hole in the law created by the 
MH(CAT)A. Under the MH(CAT)A, the Courts could either impose a sentence on 
an offender or order their detainment as a "patient". They could not do both. The 
Court could not determine the length of the offender's detainment or the type of 
institute they were to be held in. 49 Many offenders detained in rehabilitation 
47 R v Redmile [1987] 1 NZLR 157. 
48 James Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law ( 5 ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007). 
49 Mental Health (Compulsory Care and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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programmes required compulsory treatment for minimal periods of time and were 
discharged into the community swiftly. 
50 
Section 34(1)(a) of the CP(MIP)A was passed to ensure that the criminal 
courts could impose orders on such offenders which better suited their treatment 
needs. It sought to ensure that those offenders who needed care received it in a 
judicious fashion. This section enables a sentencing judge to order an offender to 
serve a finite term of imprisonment while also being concmTently detained as a 
"special patient" in a mental health hospital. 
51 If at any stage the offender ceases to 
require treatment, they are returned to prison to serve the rest of their sentence, 
unlike being discharged into the community as under the MH(CAT)A. In deciding 
whether to order a concurrent sentence,
52 as opposed to ordering a sentence merely 
of treatment, 53 the Court will have regard to the original crime. In R v S, the High 
Court held that for the most dangerous offenders a concurrent order under section 
34(1 )(a) will be appropriate.
54 By implication, the Court will be likely to impose an 
order under section 34( 1 )(b) for less serious offences. 
Ordering concurrent penal detention and mental health treatment attempts to 
marry two conceptually different aims together, namely rehabilitation and 
punishment. This change was introduced to mitigate the premature discharge of a 
disordered offender into society, who no longer required compulsory care. 
55 At 
common law, concurrent sentences were deemed appropriate where "two offences 
aiise out of a single set of facts (the one transaction) and the nature of the offending 
is sirnilar". 56 Unless two offences have arisen from a single set of facts, to say that a 
mentally disordered offender is to serve a concurrent sentence sends the message 
50 Robertson, above n 48. 
51 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 , s 34(1 )(a). 
52 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 , s 34(1 )(a). 
53 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 , s 34(1 )(b) . 
54 R v S (No 2) (1991) 7 CRNZ 576. 
55 Justice and Law Reform Committee, above n 39. 
56 Geoff Hall Sentencing: 2007 Refo1ms in Context (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) 406. 
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that they are more blameworthy than a non-disordered offender who, if having 
committed the exact same offence, would only have received a single sentence. 
The Ministry of Justice argued that imposing both a penal sentence and a 
rehabilitative sentence recognises the separate nature of the two concepts; that with 
concurrent sentencing, mental disorder will be treated until the offender is well, 
upon which punishment will be attended to. 57 This argument may have some 
validity on an academic level. However, to combine these two modes sends a 
confused message to the community about the offender and the crime they have 
committed. The label of a concmTent sentence may induce perceptions that mentally 
disordered offenders are more blameworthy or more liable than non-disordered 
offenders. Running a hospital order and a term of imprisonment concurrently rejects 
the notion that "the hospital order as a sentencing option is a benevolent alternative 
to a custodial sentence". 58 If an offender is so mentally disordered as to require 
treatment in a mental health institute, their ability to comprehend the purposes and 
principles of a sentence of imprisonment will be questionable. Accordingly, a 
concurrent sentence will be "inhumane to impose" as they will not have the 
necessary capacity for the purposes of sentencing to have effect. 59 
There exists no obvious reasoning advocating solely for concurrent 
sentencing;60 the problem of prematurely releasing offenders into the community 
could also be avoided by giving sentencing judges the power to review the question 
of imprisonment if and once the mental disorder remits itself. If, at that stage, the 
offender is deemed able to understand the purpose and implications of a penal 
sentence, they should serve the remainder of their sentence within a penal institute. 
The judge should not have the option of extending a sentence at this stage, and time 
spent within the mental health institute should contribute to the totality of the length 
of the sentence served. Consecutive sentencing is not advocated for; the single 
57 Ministry of Justice Advice on the Sentencing Bill (submission to the Justice and Law Reform 
Committee, 2001). 
58 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n I, 217. 
59 Ibid, 218. 
60 Ibid, 217. 
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sentence runs from the time a mentally disordered offender is sentenced, regardless 
of the location of where they are to serve it. This allows for incapacitation of those 
who recover from mental disorder quickly. It does not lengthen the sentence further 
for those mentally disordered offenders who take longer to get well. Parliament 
should address the issue of what purpose of sentencing is to be accorded priority, in 
particular with regard to mentally disordered offenders. The ultimate question is 
whether the judiciary should be primarily focused on social protection and 
deterrence, or on rehabilitation. The judiciary does not have to be tied to either 
exclusively, and it is a decision for the legislature as to whether they should be 
accorded equal weight or whether one should take priority. An increased focus on 
rehabilitation will result in benevolent and humane outcomes. 
5 Summa,y 
In summary, while the CP(MIP)A purports to remedy the stark deficiencies 
that were apparent in the MH(CAT)A, it also has flaws of its own which need 
addressing. Together, these deficiencies leave the making of a hospital order under 
section 34 of the CP(MIP)A with very limited scope and applicability. 
E Reclassifying Offenders 
There is difficulty in reclassifying offenders once they are deemed to no 
longer require compulsory treatment. The decision to return a disordered offender to 
serve the remainder of their concurrently running sentence in prison is made by the 
Director of Area Mental Health Services.
61 This decision can be gravely misjudged, 
which may see mentally disordered offenders prematurely returned to a penal 
institute. 62 There are no appropriate review and safeguard mechanisms for this 
decision, which is problematic and can be dangerous. This was evidenced in the 
process regarding and the treatment of convicted offender Murray Childs. Childs 
suffered from "severe depression , psychosis , and had a history of self-mutilation", 
61 Mental Health (Compulsory Care and Treatment) Act 1992, s 4 7(1 ). 
62 Ian Stewart " Lax process criticized in jail suicide" (18 May 2009) Th e Press Christchurch. 
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yet upon his return from a designated care unit, was placed into a general cell wing 
in prison where he had access to razors. The prison guards had not been notified of 
the extent of Childs' disorders, as the nurse who facilitated the transfer did not want 
the guards to think that they had a psychopath on their wing. The guards did not 
monitor Childs adequately and he subsequently committed suicide.63 
F The Sentencing Act 2002 
The Sentencing Act 2002 is used for sentencing the majority of all offenders. 
In general, most mentally disordered offenders will not meet the requirements of the 
available defences or the CP(MIP)A, and will be sentenced under the Sentencing 
Act 2002 ("the Act"). However, the Act also has its deficiencies. The majority of the 
purposes of the Act are not readily applicable to mentally disordered offenders, and 
mental disorder is entirely disregarded from the Act. 
I Pu,poses of sentencing 
New Zealand's main aim of its sentencing legislative framework focuses on 
the harm done, not why it is caused or how the circumstances may have contributed 
to it. It is largely concerned with the protection of the public at large. The 
Sentencing Act was passed in 2002 as the Labour Government's response to the 
Norm Withers referendum.64 As evidenced in the parliamentary debates during the 
first, second and third readings of the Bill, the Act was intended to be a tough 
response to what was perceived as weak sentencing and parole laws.65 This "just 
deserts" approach to sentencing ignores the reality of the effect mental disorder can 
have on the behaviour of persons.66 Accordingly, mental disorder and rehabilitation 
will often be secondary to the question of protection of the public.67 There is an 
63 Ibid. 
64 (14August2001)594NZPD 10911. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1,212. 
67 Ibid, 213. 
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"inherent contradiction" in the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders; me
ntal 
disorder itself suggests a requirement for treatment, yet the Courts always ultima
tely 
r. · hm 68 1ocus on pums ent. 
There are also other purposes of sentencing, some of which are also reflected 
in practice in New Zealand's system, others much less. The less often cited purpo
ses 
are generally those which better recognise the impact mental disorder can have on
 an 
offender's behaviour. Section 7 (1) of the Act establishes the purposes of sentenc
ing 
or otherwise dealing with offenders: 
(a) to hold the offender accountable for harm done to the victim and the 
community by the offending; or 
(b) to promote in the offender a sense of responsibility for, and 
acknowledgment of, that harm; or 
(c) to provide for the interests of the victim of the offence; or 
(d) to provide reparation for hann done by the offending; or 
(e) to denounce the conduct in which the offender was involved; or 
(f) to deter the offender or other persons from committing the same or a 
similar offence; or 
(g) to protect the community from the offender; or 
(h) to assist in the offenders rehabilitation and integration; or 
(i) a combination of 2 or more of the purposes in paragraphs (a) to (h). 
The applicability of the majority of these purposes to mentally disordered 
offenders is problematic. Disordered offenders quite often will not understand 
the 
significance of the principle of punishment as required for the purpose of deterre
nce 
to have any effect. Because mentally disordered offenders may be deemed to l
ack 
full moral responsibility, they may not deserve to be held fully accountable for t
heir 
actions, making the accountability purpose hard to apply.
69 
68 Ibid, 206 . 
69 Mackay, above n 9 . 
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The purpose of incapacitation, or social defence, 70 allows for mentally 
disordered offenders to be detained even if they may not be "blameworthy", as they 
pose a danger to society at large. The principle of proportionality juxtaposes this 
purpose in regard to mentally disordered offenders. If applied, the principle of 
proportionality will ensure that the rights of such offenders are upheld so that they 
are not subjected to unduly protracted sentences and arbitrary assumptions about 
their future behaviours. 
The purpose of incapacitation bases a sentence not on the present offence but 
on the likelihood of recidivism. This purpose can act detrimentally in regard to 
mentally disordered offenders; although not more blameworthy, they are seen as 
"riskier'' and have a greater rate of recidivism than "normal" offenders. Too great a 
focus on incapacitation leaves room for mentally disordered offenders to be 
discriminated against; they may be subjected to longer sentences than offenders of 
"normal" fortitude, based solely on the existence of mental disorder. 
Deterrence focuses on the individual offender and, through the imposition of 
exemplary sentences, seeks to deter that individual, or society at large, from 
offending. 71 Deterrence is an inappropriate purpose to apply in relation to mentally 
disordered offenders as often they will not completely comprehend the significance 
of punishment, or may not deserve it. It is more likely that mental disorder may 
mean that a given sentence "will impact on [a mentally disordered] offender more 
heavily than it would a person in normal health".72 
The purpose of restitution looks to the needs of the victim of an offence and 
requires the offender to put right the wrong done by their conduct and to restore the 
moral equilibrium.73 Unlike any other purpose of sentencing, restitution ignores the 
characteristics of the offender, and society at large. It is argued that it makes 
offenders accept responsibility for their c1ime; that it is useful because it, like 
70 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(g). 
71 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(f). 
72 R v Tsiaras [1996] I VR398. 
73 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(c). 
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rehabilitation, is "something offenders do, rather than something they have done to 
them".74 Because restitution focuses on damage and harm done to the victim, the 
intention and mentality of the offender is irrelevant. 
Rehabilitation is offender focused.
75 Rehabilitation aims to reduce recidivism 
by changing the behaviours, attitudes or skills of the offender. This is the most 
appropriate way of dealing with mentally disordered offenders. Without 
rehabilitation, the causal factor of the offender's behaviour will not be altered. If 
mental disorder is not properly addressed, the risk of recidivism cannot be reduced 
by any significant degree . If mental disorder is left untreated, the risk a mentally 
disordered offender poses to society will still be present once their sentence is served. 
This is further compounded by the fact that total irresponsibility in law by reason of 
insanity will result in indefinite detention in a mental health institute. A semi-
irresponsible person, such as a mentally disordered offender, will require not 
punishment but treatment, and will receive neither. 
In the parliamentary debates during the readings of the Sentencing Bill , 
denunciation, deterrence, and social protection were particularly emphasised. Rarely 
was rehabilitation mentioned.
76 While subsection 2 states that no single purpose was 
intended to have greater weight than any other, the time devoted to discussing each 
purpose in the House would suggest otherwise. 
2 Other principles of sentencing 
Where possible, there should be a focus on protecting the rights and liberties 
of mentally disordered offenders in the criminal justice process . Such a focus seems 
discordant with the purposes of accountability and deterrence; the purpose of 
holding a disordered offender responsible for his or her crime cannot be met unless 
74 
Ministry of Justice Sentencing and Guidance: A Discussion Paper (Ministry of Justice
, Wellington, 
1997) 79 . 
75 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(h) . 
76 Hansard, above n 64 . 
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the law has an active role in the treatment of their mental disorder. 77 Minimum 
criminalisation requires that the Court imposes the least restrictive outcome that is 
appropriate in the circumstances. For an offender of "normal" mental fortitude, a 
sentence of compulsory treatment and rehabilitation is unlikely to be the least 
restrictive outcome. The opposite may be argued for mentally disordered offenders; 
subjection to imprisonment in a penal institute will not be the least restrictive option 
available. Providing rehabilitation and treatment to these offenders will be more 
likely to be successful in reducing the risk of recidivism. 
3 Mitigating factors 
Section 9(2) of the Act lists mitigating factors that the Court must consider, 
to the extent that they are applicable, when they are sentencing an offender. They 
include: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(t) 
(g) 
the age of the offender: 
whether and when the offender pleaded guilty: 
the conduct of the victim: 
that there was a limited involvement in the offence on the offender's 
part: 
that the offender has, or had at the time the offence was committed, 
diminished intellectual capacity or understanding: 
any remorse shown by the offender, or anything as described in 
section 10: 
any evidence of the offender's previous good character. 
While subsection (2)(e) requires diminished intellectual capacity to be taken 
into account, there is no express mention of diminished mental capacity or mental 
disorder. Diminished intellectual capacity is not wide enough to cover mentally 
disordered offenders; most of which will be functioning at a "normal" intellectual 
77 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1, 207 . 
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capacity level. Subsection 4 allows the Court to take into an
y other factor it deems 
applicable, but does require not the Court to detail reasons as 
to why it did or did not 
consider the factor as relevant. 
The legislature's failure to make provision for mentally disor
dered offenders 
in the list of mitigating factors in the Act reflects the punitiv
e attitude that is taken 
towards sentencing mentally disordered offenders. It is lik
ely this was intended; 
mental disorder was not discussed once during the parlia
mentary debates. The 
blatant exclusion of mental disorder leaves room for the tri
vialising of the special 
treatment requirements a mentally disordered offender wi
ll often need. This is 
particularly so because of the limited scope of the CP(MIP)A
, which will see many 
mentally disordered offenders fall outside of it. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of South Australia in
 R v Wiskich 
established the general principle that where there is mental d
isorder, provided there 
is no link between the mental condition and the commission o
f the offence the Court 
should not depart from the norm sentencing rnles. Taking
 mental disorder into 
account as a mitigating factor where there is no link betwee
n the committal of the 
offence and the mental disorder goes against the point of havi
ng a punitive system. 
78 
While the Courts justify longer sentences for the most 
"dangerous" mentally 
disordered offenders in the name of public protection, the
re is broad consensus 
across most schools of thought that mentally disordered of
fenders should not be 
dealt with in the same manner as offenders of "normal" f
ortitude .79 In this way, 
allowing mental disorder to be taken into account as a relev
ant factor can produce 
more humane results. 
The greatest conflict within this Act is that between section
 7(1)(g) which 
advocates for the protection of the public, and section 8(h) 
which requires that the 
court: 
78 R v Wiskich [2000] SASC 64 . 
79 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1. 
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"take into account any particular circumstances of the offender that 
mean that a sentence or other means of dealing with the offender 
that would otherwise be appropriate would , in the particular 
instance, be disproportionately severe". 
This paper is mostly concerned with disproportionately severe sentence 
length. However, there could also be disproportionate severity in the offender's 
subjective experience of imprisonment. Imprisonment, particularly if a sentence is 
lengthened, may affect those with a mental disorder greater than non-disordered 
offenders. Subjective severity should be a compulsory consideration for sentencing 
judges to take into account when sentencing mentally disordered offenders. The 
subjective expe1ience of treatment and rehabilitation programmes is most likely 
going to be less severe than that of a sentence served in prison. 
The Courts have held that only upon evidence that a mentally disordered 
offender is not a risk to a community, should a mental disorder be taken into account 
as a mitigating factor and that a sentence be reduced. 80 However, the Court of 
Appeal in R v Abraham held that : 
"inability to appreciate the consequences of the offender's actions 
and to exercise independent self-control, especially when that is 
combined with evidence of a continuing disorder and of drug 
dependency which is likely to exacerbate it and increase the risk of 
re-offending, may require the sentencing judge, in the interests of the 
public at large, to put aside thoughts of discounting the penalty which 
the offence would otherwise warrant." 81 
Because the principles and purposes of sentencing are applied as normal to 
most mentally disordered offenders, there is room for sentencing judges to be greater 
swayed by public protection pleas and to increase sentences based purely on the 
80 R v Abraham (1993) 10 CRNZ446. 
81 Ibid . 
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existence of a mental disorder. Because purely l
engthening a sentence does not 
automatically provide the offender with any mental
 health care, the public interest is 
not necessarily served. What is likely to be an un
derlying cause of the offending 
may not be addressed and risk of recidivism may no
t be reduced. 
However, other cases have been decided contra
ry to the ruling in R v 
Abraham.
82 More recently, the Court of Appeal in R v Tuia he
ld that lengthening a 
sentence purely because of mental disorder would
 be unprincipled; that this would 
be a matter for mental health legislation, and not
 for criminal sentencing.
83 If an 
offender is deemed sane enough to not require trea
tment under the CP(MIP)A, their 
mental disorder should not be relevant to extending
 or decreasing the length of their 
sentence. The existence of a mental disorder shou
ld not be a reason for the early 
release of an offender into the community, witho
ut the appropriate treatment and 
rehabilitation, as would happen if mental disorder 
was listed as a mitigating factor. 
Accordingly, due to division in judicial thinking,
 the Act should be amended to 
stipulate the manner in which a sentencing judge is 
to treat mental disorder. There 
must be caution to avoid mental disorder being co
nsidered as an aggravating factor 
purely because mentally disordered offenders are of
ten considered more "risky".
84 
G The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
 Act 1990 reqmres that 
everyone has the right to freedom from discriminat
ion on the grounds established in 
the Human Rights Act 1993. These grounds prohib
it discrimination against anyone 
suffering from any psychological impairment or ab
normality. Section 22 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 gives every person
 the right to liberty, including the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained. The detainmen
t of an offender in a prison for a 
sentence longer than would be imposed but for t
he existence of mental disorder 
clashes with the right to liberty. The Comts tend to
 justify limitation on this right on 
82 Ibid. 
83 R v Tuia, above n 13 . 
84 Brookbanks and Simpson, above n 1, 205 . 
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the basis of public protection. However, in particular, if a mentally disordered 
offender is sentenced to a longer finite te1m of imprisonment in a penal institute, as 
opposed to a mental health institute, they most likely are not receiving the adequate 
treatment that they need. If an offender is so mentally disordered as to require longer 
detainment in the interests of public protection, they should never be sentenced to a 
te1m of imprisonment in a penal institute, but to one in a mental hospital. 
Accordingly, mental disorder short of insanity should only be relevant to extending 
an offender's treatment if it is in a mental health institute or rehabilitative scheme. 
To increase a sentence of imprisonment solely due to mental disorder could be 
viewed as a breach of freedom of liberty and a person's right to be free from 
discrimination. While the paramount consideration will necessarily be on the 
protection of the public, sentencing laws should conform as closely as possible with 
fundamental rights owed to all individuals.
85 
IV RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current operation of the law is not satisfactory in relation to mentally 
disordered offenders. This paper posits that, while the existing Sentencing Act 2002 
is flawed, it is the most appropriate arena for the disposition of the majority of 
mentally disordered offenders. It is not suggested that the only ethical treatment of 
all mentally disordered offenders is pure rehabilitation and therapy. However, 
reforms can and should be made which better account for the care and rehabilitation 
of mentally disordered offenders. 
A Mental Disorder Should not Become a Compulsory Mitigating Factor 
First, it is recommended that mental health and disorder should not be a 
mitigating factor in reducing the length of a sentence, particularly where there is no 
link between the crime and mental disorder. There is danger in excluding mental 
health from the list of mitigating factors; the judiciary and legal profession need to 
85 Ibid , 214 . 
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be careful that the deliberate omission of mental disorder do
es not undennine the 
special treatment requirements a mentally disordered offend
er may need. Instead, 
amendment to the Sentencing Act 2002 should be made to en
sure that mental health 
and disorder is relevant to the type and form of the punishmen
t an offender receives. 
As science and technology advances, society learns how to
 better treat mentally 
disordered offenders. A mentally disordered offender, wh
o fails to meet the 
requirements of the insanity defence, or the CP(MIP)A,
 should still receive 
treatment for their disorder, whether this is during imprisonm
ent or in community-
based facilities such as habilitation centres. They should n
ot be held in a penal 
institute solely because of mental disorder. Furthermore, they 
should not be held in a 
penal institute longer than a non-disordered offender would 
be. In this way, while 
still punishing the offender for their crime, the criminal justice
 process may better be 
able to reduce the risk ofrecidivism by treating one of the like
ly causal factors in the 
committal of the offence itself 
B Abolition of the Power to Order Concurrent Sentenc
es 
Secondly, the ability of a sentencing judge to order concur
rent sentences 
under the CP(MIP)A should be abolished. Concurrent sente
ncing sends confused 
messages to the community about blameworthiness, and fo
rces the judiciary to 
accord equal weight to the purposes of sentencing. If an of
fender is so mentally 
disordered such that they require treatment under the CP(MI
P)A, they most likely 
will not have the capacity to rationally comprehend the purpo
ses of sentencing. To 
order a concurrent sentence of imprisonment would therefo
re be inhumane. For 
mentally disordered offenders, the legislature should make th
e choice between the 
two discordant aims of sentencing; social protection or rehab
ilitation. A concurrent 
sentence order, where an offender has not committed more
 than one offence, is 
unnecessarily discriminatory against mentally disordered off
enders. The problems 
that arose under the MH(CA T)A can be avoided in the sa
me way as imposing 
concmTent sentences as by imposing a single sentence. In the case 
where an offender 
is to receive care under the CP(MIP)A, the courts should retai
n the power to review 
the question of the sentence if and once the illness remits itself
, and the offender has 
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the rational capacity to understand the purpose and implications of a penal sentence. 
The offender should not be eligible for release to the community if their specific 
mental disorder improves at any stage of their sentence. 
C Rehabilitation: Policy and Resources 
The limited scope of the CP(MIP)A, exacerbated by the limited application 
of defences to a mentally disordered offender, often leaves a sentencing judge with 
no option other than imposing a sentence of imprisonment in a penal institute. This 
is in itself problematic; it is widely accepted that the mental health services in 
prisons are seriously lacking and deficient. 86 The lack of treatment for mentally 
disordered offenders places not only the offenders at risk, but also other prisoners 
and also prison staff. 
While the Court of Appeal in R v Arama dealt with an offender who was 
intellectually disabled, the judgment outlined that while there is the provision of 
some mental health facilities within prisons, they are generally reactive. They do not 
support long term rehabilitative goals and are generally inadequate in addressing the 
mental disorders which are so prevalent in the population of prisons.87 
The inadequacy of resources to deal with mental disorder within penal 
institutions has recently been evidenced in the suicide of prisoner Antonie Dixon. 
Dixon was indisputably mentally disordered ; he suffered from addiction to alcohol 
and "P", a class A methamphetamine. Dixon refused to take medications prior to his 
death, and was often beaten in prison by other inmates. At trial , while he failed to 
satisfy the requirements of the insanity defence, prosecutors accepted that Dixon did 
suffer from a severe personality disorder and paranoia. 88 Although Dixon committed 
suicide prior to being sentenced, his suicide demonstrates the inadequacy of within-
86 New Zealand Office of the Auditor-General Mental health services fo r prisoners (Office of the 
Auditor-General , Wellington, 2008). 
87 R v Arama (1993) 10 CRNZ 592. 
88 Elizabeth Binning "Dixon: 'They Want Me to Kill Myself" (6 February 2009) Th e New Zealand 
Herald Auckland. 
30 
prison mental health facilities to care for those pris
oners who have not satisfied the 
test of requiring treatment in their own interest or 
the interests of the safety of the 
bl
. 89 
pu IC. 
The Ministry of Justice has acknowledged that
 imprisonment is never 
appropriate for intellectually disabled offenders, bu
t do not hold the same view for 
mentally disordered offenders. In their submissions 
on the Criminal Procedure 
(Mentally Impaired Persons) Bill, they noted the b
acklog of prisoners waiting for 
psychiatric treatment. 
90 Lord Butler stated in his Report of the Commi
ttee on 
Mentally Abnormal Offenders that where an of
fender suffered from a mental 
disorder, they should be placed in the care and
 custody of the mental health 
institutions as opposed to being sent to prison.
91 The idea that mentally disordered 
offenders should never be subjected to detainment i
n a penal institute, over 30 years 
later, is still a contentious issue. There is continuou
sly strengthening evidence, that 
is now almost universally accepted, that as less m
entally disordered offenders are 
treated in mental health institutes, the numbers in p
rison dramatically increase, and 
vice versa.
92 Henry Rollin concludes his article mentally disord
ered offenders with 
"on the grounds of humanity and public safety, 
it is unacceptable that mental 
disorder in this readily accessible group of offen
ders should go undetected and 
untreated ."
93 
The resources available for treatment and rehab
ilitation in the criminal 
justice process need to be increased. While the gen
eral focus of the criminal justice 
process is on punishment and social protection, m
entally disordered offenders will 
not receive the treatment that they require with
in penal institutes. In order to 
89 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Ac
t 2003 , s 34 . 
90 Ministry of Justice Advice on the Criminal Pro
cedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Bill 
(submission to the Justice and Law Reform Commit
tee, 2002) . 
91 Lord Butler Report of th e Committee on MentallyAb
no,mal Offenders (Cmnd 6244 , Home Office 
and Department ofHealth and Social Security, Lond
on, 1975). 
92 Henry Rollin The Mentally Ill should be in hospit
al, not prison (1996) 2 Journal of Forensic 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 326. 
93 Ibid, 329 . 
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effectively rehabilitate and reduce the risk of recidivism of mentally disordered 
offenders, it must be recognised that prolonged incarceration, without adequate 
treatment, 1s not of assistance. Whether through greater funding for therapeutic 
programmes within penal institutes, or greater funding for community-based 
treatments such as habilitation centres, the treatment of mental disorder should be 
better addressed. While the strongest focus of our post-trial criminal justice process 
is on "just deserts", the commitment to addressing the root of offending will 
continue to be neglected. Greater dedication to establishing a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with the immense incidence of mental disorder within prisons is 
required.94 
V CONCLUSION 
Mentally disordered offenders in the criminal justice process are subject to 
some differential treatment under the law. However, the majority of mental disorder 
goes untreated. Sentencing judges are not required to take mental health into account 
as a mitigating factor when determining an appropriate sentence. The insanity 
defence is narrow and harsh, and with automatism, excludes a many of the most 
mentally disordered offenders. In determining provocation, "mental characteristics" 
are rarely relied on. When they are, they are rarely successful. The defence of 
diminished responsibility has not been introduced in New Zealand, and it is unlikely 
that it will be. Accordingly, the defences available are not fully adequate in 
appropriately sentencing mentally disordered offenders. 
Vast improvements to the mental health services within penal institutes are 
required; it is not adequate to discriminate against mentally disordered offenders 
merely because there is no miracle cure for their disorders. If the purposes of 
punishment cannot practically be applied to and understood by mentally disordered 
offenders, finite sentences of imprisonment will not be the best route for dealing 
94 Rt Hon Chief Justice Dame Sian Elias "Blameless Babes" (Annual 2009 Shirley Smith Address, 
Wellington, 9 July 2009). 
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with them. While the d1ive for the purposes 
of social protection and deterrence for 
criminal offences from victims and society i
n general is understandable as pait of 
human nature, it denies the fact that pris
on sentences are often incapable of 
reforming most mentally disordered offen
ders. It is inevitable that they will 
eventually end up in the community again. W
ithout treatment, the 1isk of recidivism 
will not have changed. Relationships between
 the mental health sector and the legal 
profession should be encouraged; working 
closer to enlighten society about the 
effect mental disorder may have on behavio
ur. There should be greater shaiing of 
knowledge between the two professions, so 
that the treatment and punishment of 
mentally disordered offenders is not left s
olely in the hands of the judiciary. 
Meanwhile, scientists and legal professionals
, and the judiciary should devote time 
and effort into determining and developing
 the most appropriate sentencing and 
disposition options. 
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